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Abstract: Dominant or apparently dominant internet platform increasingly become 
subject to both antitrust investigations and further-reaching political calls for regu-
lation. While Google is currently in the focus of the discussion, the next candidate is 
already on the horizon – the ubiquitous online trading platform Amazon. Competi-
tors and suppliers but also famous economists like Paul Krugman unite in criticizing 
Amazon’s market power and alleged abuse of it. In this paper, we collect the multi-
tude of allegations against Amazon and categorize them according to types of po-
tential anticompetitive conduct or types of market failure. We provide an economic 
analysis of these allegations based upon economic theory as well as publicly availa-
ble information and data. As one of our main results, we find that the most severe 
allegations against Amazon do not hold from an economic perspective and, conse-
quently, do not warrant regulation or other drastic interventions (like breaking the 
company up). However, several areas of conduct, in particular, the use of best price 
clauses and the (anti-) competitive interplay of Amazon and the major publishers in 
the e-book market require competition policy action. The standard antitrust in-
struments, enriched with modern economic theory, should suffice to disincentivize 
the identified anticompetitive conduct for now. 
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I.   Introduction 
In October 2014, the Nobel memorial prize laureate and famous economist Paul 
Krugman (2014) called for antitrust action against Amazon, arguing that Amazon 
had reached a powerful position comparable to Rockefeller’s Standard Oil in the 
1900s. He vehemently and most clearly voiced his concerns that Amazon is only 
starting to abuse this power, that this will be detrimental to suppliers, customers 
and society – and that therefore society must take action. Or, as his central mes-
sage reads in his own words: “Amazon.com, the giant online retailer, has too much 
power, and it uses that power in ways that hurt America” (Krugman 2014). 
Krugman may be the most famous name, but he is not alone in voicing concerns 
about market power, undue business dominance and anticompetitive behavior by 
Amazon in various markets and various instances. Influential Berkeley professor of 
public policy Robert Reich (2015) considers what he calls “big tech platforms” to be 
“way too powerful”, claiming, inter alia: “Meanwhile, Amazon is now the first stop 
for almost a third of all American consumers seeking to buy anything. Talk about 
power.” And very recently, for instance, the American authors’ guild called for anti-
trust action against Amazon, presenting a position paper with a long list of allega-
tions of anticompetitive practices (Authors United 2015a,b). In summary, the au-
thors’ collective emphasizes “Amazon has used its dominance in ways that we be-
lieve harm the interests of America’s readers, impoverish the book industry as a 
whole, damage the careers of (and generate fear among) many authors, and im-
pede the free flow of ideas in our society” (Authors United 2015a: 1). Furthermore, 
a large number of economic and business journalists as well as representatives of 
competitors, suppliers and customers from various parts of the world have echoed 
these allegations and added numerous more. The range of concerns covers, inter 
alia, squeezing of suppliers, deterrence and predation of competitors, destruction 
of local stores as well as various types of unfair treatment. Since many of these 
concerns have predominantly been raised outside academia (with some notable 
exceptions, see above), we have tried to sort them and connect them to economic 
concepts that may indeed reflect anticompetitive arrangements or behavior. In do-
ing so, we identified five groups of concerns or allegations repeatedly raised 
against Amazon’s competitive behavior, namely the creation of negative externali-
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ties by destroying the local business culture (see III.1), predation and monopoliza-
tion (see III.2), being a natural monopoly that requires regulation (see III.3), unfair 
competition (see III.4), and vertical abuse of dominance in the e-book market at the 
expense of publishers and authors (see III.5). 
 
In the light of the recent antitrust activity regarding online platforms in Europe1, 
we analyze in this paper, whether Amazon qualifies as ‘the next Google’, i.e. the 
next online platform that requires intensive antitrust scrutiny due to various con-
cerns and complaints. The topic of potentially anticompetitive actions by dominant 
online platforms is currently high on the political agenda. The European Commis-
sion started a sector inquiry into online commerce in 2015 (European Commission 
2015c) and already in late 2014, the European Parliament voted in favor of split-
ting-up dominant online platforms. In the aftermath, talks about instituting a new 
regulator supervising online platforms à la Google, Facebook, Amazon, etc. sur-
faced and – despite receiving criticism from Competition Comissioner Vestager2 – 
have not fallen silent since. In June 2015, the Commission opened a formal investi-
gation into Amazon’s e-book distribution arrangements (European Commission 
2015d). This investigation relates to the concerns and allegations we address in 
sections III.2 and III.5 in this paper. Although the concentration of online markets 
has recently raised fears of possible misconduct of dominant companies, economic 
analysis shows that many publicly expressed concerns and allegations are either 
unjustified or do not warrant competition policy interventions. However, we also 
identify several areas of concern where competition authorities need to monitor 
1 As of writing, the European Commission has issued a statement of objections against Google 
claiming that the search engine market leader abuses market power by biasing search results in 
favor of its own comparison shopping service and at the expense of its competitors (European 
Commission 2015a,b). Further investigations into more search bias concerns as well as into alle-
gations of scraping (preview windows showing content of searched-for websites to an extent 
that searchers do not need to visit these websites anymore), into anticompetitive restrictions on 
advertisers (ad-portability, blocking clauses regarding rival sites, exclusivity contracts, etc.) and 
into bundling Android operating systems with other Google software and service products are 
still ongoing. Other jurisdictions like India have also started similar investigations, whereas the 
U.S. closed its investigation against rather mild commitments from Google in 2013. Beyond 
Google, hotel booking platforms as well as online taxi services face diverse antitrust investiga-
tions by national competition authorities in several European countries. 
2 See http://www.nasdaq.com/article/eu-competition-chief-warns-against-new-regulations-for-
internet-companies-20150618-00141 (retrieved 2015-09-07). 
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Amazon’s strategies closely or where antitrust investigations might be justified. 
Notwithstanding, we remain rather skeptical towards Krugman’s assessment. 
 
In order to discuss the various concerns and allegations from the perspective of 
economics (section III), we first give a short overview of the business model of Am-
azon and the various markets where it is active (section II). As we have to rely on 
publicly available data, we often cannot provide exact market definitions and 
shares, however, the general structure of the relevant markets will become visible 
in an operational way (for our purposes). After we assessed the different concerns 
and allegations (section III), we discuss potential competition policy and regulatory 
remedies (section IV) before we draw conclusions (section V). 
 
II.   The Business of Amazon 
Founded in 1994, Amazon of Seattle, Washington, U.S., has become the largest 
electronic commerce company worldwide in merely two decades, selling, inter alia, 
books, music & movies, consumer electronics, games & toys, beauty & care, home 
& garden, clothing, sports & outdoor, and much more. Today, it combines two 
business models: 
(i) Amazon acts as an online retailer, buying products from producers 
and reselling them to consumers. 
(ii) Amazon provides an online marketplace where it intermediates 
sellers (producers, shops) and buyers of products. 
 
The decision what products are sold via classical retailing and what products are 
traded via the marketplace is made by Amazon based on profit considerations and 
varies frequently. Furthermore, Amazon offers streaming and cloudcomputing plat-
forms, data processing and networking services, produces consumer electronics (e-
book reader Kindle, tablet Kindle Fire, smartphone Fire Phone, etc.), business elec-
tronics (credit card readers), digital content (games, e-books, etc.), and is currently 
looking to enter the software markets for emailing and booking services (WorkMail, 
Amazon Destinations, etc.). According to founder Jeffrey P. Bezos, however, the 
core business of Amazon is individualized consumption pattern data (Packer 2014). 
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Besides internal growth, Amazon expands internationally through company takeo-
vers, e.g. Abebooks, an online marketplace for used, rare and out of print book ti-
tles, in 2008, robots technology company Kiva Systems for US$ 775 million in 2012, 
social reading service Goodreads in 2013, and Twitch, a video game streaming ser-
vice, in 2014. 
 
Due to its worldwide presence and relevance, Amazon is often characterized as be-
ing dominant. From an economic perspective, dominance relies on a sound delinea-
tion of markets and needs to be analyzed market by market. In the case of Ama-
zon, this task would exceed the space of this paper. Moreover, the data necessary 
to provide detailed market delineations is not publicly available. An exception is 
Germany where the national competition authority calculated market shares for 
2012 for a large number of product markets. According to their estimation, Ama-
zon was leading these German online trading markets with an average market 
share of about 30-40 per cent (Bundeskartellamt 2013c). Beyond that, there is an-
other problem: does the delineation of single-by-single product markets appropri-
ately grasp the real effects on competition? Or does Amazon actually act on a (sin-
gle) market for online superstores and would that capture the competitive situation 
more accurately? Furthermore, the marketplace part of Amazon’s business displays 
the characteristics of a two-sided or platform market (Evans & Schmalensee 2007; 
Haucap & Heimeshoff 2014), which makes market delineation notoriously difficult 
(Filistrucchi et al. 2014; Kehder 2013; Dewenter et al. 2014). Since we cannot an-
swer these questions in this paper, we will distinguish in the following section be-
tween a scenario in which Amazon is dominant and one where it faces effective 
competition. 
 
Out of the many markets that Amazon is competing on, the markets for books – 
both print books and e-books – is of particular concern from an antitrust perspec-
tive. Therefore, we report at least some market share information for this industry. 
According to Authors United (2015b: 5-6), Amazon accumulates in the U.S. up to 
75 per cent of online sales of physical books, more than 65 per cent of e-book 
sales, about 40 per cent of total sales of newly published books, and up to 85 per 
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cent of e-book sales of self-published authors.3 They expect these shares to keep on 
increasing in the coming years, despite competition from Apple and Google (Au-
thors United 2015b: 6). In Germany, Amazon controls approximately 80 per cent of 
online books sales whereas its market share of the total book market (print- and e-
books) is about 25 per cent (Haucap 2014). In 2014, Amazon’s market share of e-
book sales in Germany was ‘only’ about 39 per cent. Market leader was the so-
called Tolino alliance (consisting of large bookstore chains like Thalia, Hugendubel 
and others as well as relevant reading clubs like Weltbild, DerClub) with a share of 
45 percent (Börsenblatt 2014). However, the members of the Tolino alliance are 
independent companies that merely cooperate on providing a common e-book 
reader under the Tolino brand. In terms of single company shares, Amazon (39 per 
cent) leads the German e-book market from Thalia (20 per cent) and Weltbild (12 
per cent). No other competitor exceeds a share of 3 per cent (Börsenblatt 2014).  
While it is true that market shares alone do not suffice to identify dominance, in 
particular in online markets and markets trading digital products, these numbers 
do show that Amazon is the biggest player in online book selling and in e-book 
retailing by some margin. 
 
III.  Concerns about Amazon’s Strategies and their Assessment from an Eco-
nomic Perspective 
1.   Negative Externalities: Destruction of Traditional Retailing Business 
The first allegation is predominantly put forward in the public discussion. The claim 
is that Amazon destroys traditional offline business by offering a retailing service 
offline competitors cannot compete with. Thus, Amazon causes a negative exter-
nality on offline business companies. This allegation relates to all of Amazon’s re-
tailing activities and is not limited to books although the destruction of offline 
bookstores is a frequently used example.4 Probably, this is because books – along 
with recorded music – were the first products that Amazon sold. Consequently, the 
effects on offline bookstores became visible before Amazons business practices had 
time to affect dealers in product categories it entered later. 
3 These figures approximately stand in line with other publicly available figures.  
4 We address the peculiarities of the market for books in section III.5. 
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From an economic perspective, however, the character of the claimed externality 
needs to be qualified. Economic theory distinguishes pecuniary externalities from 
technological externalities. While the first are transferred via a market relation or 
process, the second hits parties that are unrelated in a market sense to the origina-
tor of the externality. This distinction is important because only technological ex-
ternalities distort the market and may lead to market failure warranting interven-
tion or regulation. Pecuniary externalities, in contrast, are normal and necessary 
market effects: if a company offers a better product, then demand will shift away 
from its competitors and towards the company offering the product that serves 
consumer interests in a superior way. This is particularly true in the case of funda-
mental innovations: the invention of motor cars harmed the business of manufac-
turers of horse-drawn carriages and train services as well as the invention of per-
sonal computers harmed the business of typewriter producers. These pecuniary ex-
ternalities are an inherent phenomenon of economic dynamics and contribute to 
economic welfare because allocation is driven towards products and businesses 
that provide more consumer welfare. 
 
The alleged negative externality on offline business represents such a pecuniary ex-
ternality: consumers switch away from offline shopping towards online shopping 
because they draw more utility from online shopping (convenient shopping from 
home, no restrictions on opening hours, comfortable delivery, lower searching 
costs, etc.), i.e. it serves their preferences better. So, Amazon may be “guilty” of 
providing a better shopping service than other retailers but this cannot be held 
against Amazon. From an economic perspective, this allegation is unjustified and 
does not warrant any intervention or regulation. 
 
Moreover, it is questionable whether the allegation that Amazon destroys offline 
business is plausible and can be supported by empirical evidence. If the activity of-
fline shopping creates an additional utility (seeing and touching the goods, shop-
ping as an event, socializing, etc.) then it appears to be implausible that it will be 
‘destroyed’. By now, it certainly cannot be claimed that offline business is about to 
disappear. If comprehensive destruction of offline business occurred, then a nega-
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tive external effect on society values might be possible in terms of wasteland 
downtowns, loss of societal communication, negative cultural effects, perhaps even 
lack of individual motion, etc. However, Amazon leading to wasteland downtowns 
appears to be quite a stretch and such a doomsday scenario is not realistically on 
the horizon. 
 
In summary, the allegation of creating negative externalities on offline business 
must be rejected from an economic perspective. 
 
2.   Predatory Pricing and Monopolization 
A second allegation claims that Amazon monopolizes its markets by eliminating its 
competitors through predatory pricing strategies. In Amazon’s case, predatory pric-
ing is said to consist of direct below-cost pricing, anticompetitive discounts, and/or 
free additional services like delivery. Allegedly, Amazon deliberately forgoes profits 
by setting predatory prices in order to first monopolize the markets and then raise 
prices to exploit dependent customers (Authors United 2015b: 3). This is sometimes 
viewed to be the reason behind the fact that Amazon does not have a great history 
of making significant profits so far but still receives a strong and increasing valua-
tion from the stock markets (ibid.: 3). 
 
a.   Predatory Pricing, Bundling and Tying in the Retailing Business 
Modern economics view rational predatory pricing as a strategy that requires the 
existence of market power (Fudenberg & Tirole 1986; Bolton & Scharfstein 1990; 
Baumol 1996; Bolton et al. 2000). Furthermore, standard predatory pricing theory 
does not apply to platform markets (theory of two-sided markets; Rochet & Tirole 
2002; Evans & Schmalensee 2007) where anticompetitive exclusion through pricing 
strategies is possible but requires different circumstances (Motta & Vasconcelos 
2012). As a consequence, the application of standard predatory pricing theory fo-
cuses on the classical retailing business. It is important to note, however, that un-
dercutting competitors’ prices does not automatically imply that Amazon is engag-
ing in predatory pricing strategies. Lower prices may be due to lower costs because 
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of a more efficient organization, advantages of online retailing, or a number of 
other reasons. Undercutting the competition in prices is, of course, not per se anti-
competitive. Instead, it is an inherent element of welfare-increasing price competi-
tion that more efficient companies undercut the prices of less efficient companies. 
Suspicions about predatory pricing only surface when prices are set below costs 
and sufficiently high entry barriers offer scope for a post-predation recoupment 
period. 
 
There is a controversial academic discussion when exactly prices are below costs or 
what cost categories are relevant here, inter alia, due to the problem of how to al-
locate overhead costs of retailing companies to specific products they sell. Howev-
er, it is safe to infer below-cost pricing when selling prices of a retailer are below its 
purchasing prices. To our best knowledge there is no indication that Amazon sells 
below purchasing prices with the exception of the market for e-books where its 
selling prices sometimes undercut purchasing prices by up to 30 per cent (Kirk-
wood 2014; Vezzoso 2015).5 Consequently, and in the absence of contradicting 
empirical evidence, predatory pricing allegations are limited to the e-book market. 
E-books are sold by Amazon according to a standard retailing model, not via the 
marketplace concept. At first sight, therefore, no platform market defense applies. 
Furthermore, a focus on e-books corresponds to the e-book retailing market being 
one of the markets with the highest probability of Amazon enjoying market power 
(see section II). Eventually, direct network effects may constitute entry barriers (alt-
hough the amount and effectiveness is controversial, see section III.3). 
 
However, three more things require consideration. First, Amazon offers a wide 
range of e-books and an even wider range of other products. This opens scope for 
loss-leading strategies: generally, multi-product retailers may sell some products 
below-cost in order to attract customers in the hope that – once they are “visiting” 
the store – they will not only buy the special offers but also other products that are 
priced above costs, so that the total margin for the multi-product retailer remains 
5 In the U.S., there are also reports about sales of print books below purchasing prices (see Petro-
celli 2012). 
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positive. Loss-leading strategies are not per se anticompetitive and do not neces-
sarily constitute predatory pricing; they merely represent a case of a mixed calcula-
tion (hybrid costing) over several products or product categories. Kirkwood (2014: 
49-54) reports that investigations by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department 
of Justice found a positive margin over all e-book sales of Amazon, which points 
towards a loss-leading strategy rather than towards predatory pricing.6 Probably, 
this is even more true considering the entire product range of Amazon. There 
might be a special case, however, if Amazon sets below-cost prices for a subgroup 
of its product range, which roughly matches the total product range of its competi-
tors in the relevant product market of that subgroup. For instance, if Amazon sold 
all books below costs and cross-subsidized the consequent losses by the profits of 
its beauty & care products, thus, it might drive pure bookstores without the option 
to cross-subsidize out of the market. In this special case, a predatory strategy in 
order to monopolize the market for this selected range of products may exist and 
would be anticompetitive. We are not aware of empirical evidence for such a case, 
though. 
 
Secondly, interaction effects with the market for e-book readers must be consid-
ered. With its Kindle e-book reader, Amazon entered the reading device market in 
2007 and reached a market-leading position in the market for specialized e-reading 
devices in many countries. For instance in Germany, Amazon’s Kindle held a market 
share of 43 per cent in 2014, clearly leading from Tolino reading devices (12 per 
cent), Sony (11 per cent) and Trekstor (11 %).7 Reported figures for the UK range 
between 50 per cent and 95 per cent.8 Since e-books and e-readers are comple-
ments, bundling and tying strategies may be anticompetitive if the bundling com-
pany has a dominant position or market power in one of the two markets. It may 
6 See also Plaintiffs‘ Pretrial Memorandum of Law, US vs. Apple, Case 1:12-cv-02826-DLC, 
 www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f296700/296794.pdf, 6-7. 
7 http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/183611/umfrage/marktanteile-von-e-readern-in-
 deutschland/ (retrieved 2015-09-21, 22:59). 
8 See http://www.publishingtechnology.com/2014/10/kindle-is-the-king-of-mobile-reading-
platforms-but-ibooks-is-catching-up-fast/ (2015-09-24; 14:06) and 
http://goodereader.com/blog/electronic-readers/amazon-controls-95-of-the-ebook-market-in-the-
uk (2015-09-24; 14:08). Note, however, that e-books may often be read on tablet computers as 
well. 
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then abuse its power by leveraging it to monopolize the other market. For instance, 
Amazon may sell e-books below-cost in order to induce customers to buy the Kin-
dle e-reader and, thus, create a path-dependency: if a customer has the Kindle e-
reader, she may be more prone to continue buying e-books from Amazon. This ef-
fect is reinforced if different e-reading systems are incompatible to each other, i.e. 
if e-books bought from Amazon can only be read on the Kindle device and on no 
other, competing devices, while e-books bought from other retailers cannot be 
read on the Kindle device. In such a scenario, an anticompetitive lock-in of consum-
ers may result, which offers Amazon the option to raise e-book prices above the 
competitive level once the consumers are “caught” in and locked-into Amazon’s 
exclusive format. The other way around, Amazon may offer its Kindle device below-
cost9 in order to lock-in consumers in a similar way. This anticompetitive story, 
however, rests on the incompatibility between e-reading devices. If consumers can 
freely interchange e-books and e-readers (i.e. freely combine contents and devices), 
then no anticompetitive lock-in should arise. Quite in contrast, loss leading offers 
of devices or contents may then contribute to the diffusion of a new technology, 
creating midterm consumer welfare. While there is indication that Amazon’s bun-
dling and tying strategies may have been anticompetitive at times, these concerns 
should be alleviated with the introduction of compatibility apps since 2009 (several 
times enhanced since then) that allows for Amazon content to be read on non-
Kindle devices (De los Santos & Wildenbeest 2014). Still, the lack of reverse compat-
ibility – allowing reading non-Amazon content on Kindle-devices – does ceteris pa-
ribus not support consumer welfare.10 
 
Thirdly, despite their convenience for risk- and/or transaction cost-adverse consum-
ers, flatrate tariffs for e-books may represent another issue and concern because of 
distortive effects on incentive structures and efficiency (see Köhler 2015: ch. 4.2.4.9 
and 5.3.6 for an analysis).  
9 There are press reports that Amazon indeed sold its e-reader below costs some years ago (Petro-
celli 2012). 
10 Calibre, a free and open source e-book library management application, offers compatibility ser-
vice in both directions, however, only for content without copy-protection technology or digital-
rights management systems. 
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b.   Pricing Restrictions in the Marketplace Business 
Amazon’s pricing strategies raise antitrust concerns also in the marketplace line of 
its business where Amazon acts as a two-sided platform matching sellers (e.g. 
shops) and buyers (e.g. consumers) similar to a virtual shopping mall. Here the al-
legation is that Amazon harms competition by setting best-price clauses for mar-
ketplace suppliers, i.e. shops selling at Amazon Marketplace are required to sell for 
the same or higher prices at other platforms (but not for lower prices) and/or to 
inform Amazon about its pricing at other distribution channels.  
 
In general, best-price clauses may harm price competition (i) when hassle costs are 
low via stabilizing a collusive equilibrium and (ii) when hassle costs are high via 
foreclosure as well as monopolization/abuse of dominance (inter alia, Moorthy & 
Winter 2006; Kretschmer & Budzinski 2011; Baake & Schwalbe 2013; Boik & Corts 
2013). In the first case (low hassle costs), best-price clauses (and their relatives un-
der various names11) harm price competition among platforms or sellers because 
easily detectable deviations facilitate price convergence and eventually establish 
uniform online prices. This process is effective if either a sufficient number of rele-
vant marketplaces employs best-price clauses (cartel-like collusive equilibrium) or if 
a must-supply platform (i.e. sellers cannot afford not to sell via this platform) en-
forces such clauses. Furthermore, best-price clauses may unilaterally hamper the 
growth – or successful entry – of (hitherto smaller) competing maverick platforms 
because if direct and indirect network effects are sufficiently strong, mavericks and 
newcomers depend on being able to significantly undercut the incumbents in 
terms of pricing. Thus, a double strategy of reducing competition between incum-
bents and deterring mavericks and newcomers becomes possible. Obviously, the 
price a market under best price clauses converges to need not be a ‘low’ price in 
absolute terms, i.e. the price under effective price competition. Instead, it will typi-
cally be a higher price in the midterm (Buccirossi 2008; Salop & Scott Morton 
2013). 
11 For instance, most-favored-customer clauses, most-favored-nation clauses (even though no na-
tions are involved), meet-the-competition clauses, platform most-favored-customer agreements, 
platform most-favored-customer clauses, etc. (see Köhler 2015, ch. 4.1.2.4 and 4.3 for a com-
prehensive differentiation). 
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For our purposes, we can limit out analysis to this low hassle cost case (and do not 
need to dwell into the high hassle cost world). Online markets are characterized by 
comparably low hassle costs because price comparisons between online platforms 
(or other online distribution channels) create considerably lower search costs than 
comparisons between offline shops. Therefore, the low hassle costs scenario is rele-
vant for the Amazon case. Due to the comparatively low hassle costs, the anticom-
petitive character of best-price clauses (and related arrangements) tends to be 
stronger online than offline. In the special case of Amazon, an additional factor 
aggravating the anticompetitive effect is that due to its hybrid business model Am-
azon also acts as a horizontal competitor of the marketplace sellers. This strength-
ens the price collusion effect (Bundeskartellamt 2013c). 
 
From 2010 on, Amazon required sellers on its marketplace to accept a best-price 
clause relating to all other non-physical sales channels (i.e. online sales and cata-
logue sales). Offline shops were not included. Despite the limitation of the clauses 
to online sales, the Federal Cartel Office of Germany found a price-increasing effect, 
thus establishing anticompetitive effects through cartel-like price collusion (Bun-
deskartellamt 2013c). If Amazon’s marketplace additionally represents a must-
supply platform for online businesses, then the harm to price competition is further 
increased. Consequently, several national competition authorities in Europe ad-
dressed this issue under the umbrella of the European Competition Network and 
forced Amazon to stop its best-price clause policy in Europe (Bundeskartellamt 
2013a, b, c). Very recently, the European Commission started an investigation into 
similar clauses applied in Amazon’s e-book distribution system (European Commis-
sion 2015d). 
 
In summary, there is little available indication that Amazon engages in predatory 
pricing in its ‘classic’ retailing business. However, competition agencies need to 
keep an eye on possible bundling and tying effects between the markets for e-
readers (device market) and for e-books (content market). Strategic incompatibili-
ties between contents and devices from different suppliers constrain competition 
and decrease consumer welfare. Mutual compatibility would also intensify platform 
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competition (Haucap & Heimeshoff 2014), should the e-book market move towards 
a two-sided market structure in the future (see also below section 5). With respect 
to the marketplace business but also to wholesale retailing, best-price clauses and 
their relatives represent a concern for price competition and consumer welfare 
from an economic perspective. This led to successful interventions of several na-
tional competition authorities in Europe. Altogether, allegations of anticompetitive 
pricing and monopolization strategies require a differentiated assessment. Low(er) 
prices alone are no indication of anticompetitive and welfare-reducing behavior – 
quite in contrast, they represent scope for increasing consumer welfare though ef-
ficiencies and intensified competition. 
 
3.   Natural Monopoly: One Platform for Everything? 
The economics of platforms include strong (direct and indirect) network effects 
that may under certain conditions promote dominant positions or even monopolies 
on efficiency grounds. As a consequence, online markets may ‘naturally’ tend to-
wards monopolies (Dewenter & Rösch 2010). This motivates calls for a regulation 
of the monopoly platform as if it was a sort of a public utility (inter alia, DeThier 
2014). In this context, Amazon may be viewed as a dominant or even monopolistic 
gatekeeper for commercial trading of many products. The idea would be that every 
producer or shop needs to have (non-discriminated) access to Amazon’s market-
place in order to be able to stay in business.  
 
Compared to offline businesses, online retailing platforms like Amazon are charac-
terized by different cost structures when it comes to (virtual) “stocking” and pre-
senting the goods as well as regarding related services (payment systems, admin-
istration, etc.): variable costs are comparatively lower in relation to fixed costs. 
Note, however, that the fashionable notion of the “zero marginal cost economy” 
merely relates to digital content (if at all), whereas the majority of Amazon’s busi-
ness concerns trade of physical products where marginal costs remain relevant. The 
literature about online platforms has developed a set of criteria to assess whether 
an online market is likely to be characterized by one dominant company or whether 
competition among platforms may be sustainable (Evans & Schmalensee 2007, 
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2015; Haucap & Heimeshoff 2014). Even though this literature refers to two-sided 
markets – hence, in our case the marketplace business model – these criteria are 
also useful to evaluate the tendency to monopoly in ‘classic’ online retailing. 
 
The first aspect relates to the strength of the direct and indirect network effects. It 
represents a rather specific issue of two-sided markets, i.e. the marketplace busi-
ness model. Here, the utility of both market sides – shops and customers – increas-
es with a higher participation of their own group (direct network effect) and of the 
other group (indirect network effect). The marketplace brings suppliers and cus-
tomers together and facilitates their matching by reducing transaction costs. This 
may drive market concentration up to the point that a single platform represents 
the efficient structure. For this to happen the direct and indirect network effects 
need to be sufficiently strong and the (transaction) costs of alternative matching 
sufficiently high. It appears to be plausible that the marginal utility of an additional 
seller or buyer for the respective other side will decrease after the platform has 
reached a sustainable size, thus limiting the pro-concentration effect long before 
the market volume has been reached. Furthermore, alternative matching of sellers 
and buyers with non-prohibitive transaction costs (direct sale via suppliers’ homep-
ages, ‘classic’ offline shopping and shopping malls, etc.) is available, further limit-
ing the network-effect tendency towards a monopoly platform.   
 
Secondly, problems of congestion or overload may limit the growth (and ability to 
achieve persistent market dominance) of platforms. In contrast to offline business, 
congestion problems of online retailers as well as online marketplaces are consider-
ably less relevant. Note, however, that notwithstanding the lesser relevance of con-
gestion, X-inefficiencies (Leibenstein 1966, 1992) remain a limiting factor for the 
growth of both online retailers and marketplaces.  
 
Thirdly, an important aspect relates to the behavior of users, namely whether they 
engage in multi-homing or in single-homing. The latter describes a situation where 
users – consumers in the classic retailing model and suppliers/shops and customers 
in the marketplace model – limit themselves to one platform. A preference for one-
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stop shopping, i.e. customers prefer to buy as much of their products as possible 
from one online retailer, may favor single-homing in both models. Similarly, in the 
marketplace model, sellers may prefer single-homing if they are small (and lack ca-
pacity to administer shops on several marketplaces), sell unique items, or if reputa-
tion is both platform-specific and comparatively costly. Single-homing promotes a 
tendency towards one dominant retailer or marketplace. On the other hand, if con-
sumers prefer to diversify their online shopping or sellers prefer to diversify their 
distribution channels, then multi-homing favors competitive coexistence of several 
platforms and retailers. Switching costs play an important role: if switching from 
one marketplace (retailer) to another does not involve significant costs, multi-
homing of customers and sellers is probable. While switching costs between online 
trading platforms may not be zero (platform-specific accounts, specific handling 
knowledge, individualized recommendations and advertising if that is welcome, 
etc.), they appear to be negligible for customers (e.g. buy-without-account-options, 
standardized payment systems, etc.) but may be more relevant for sellers, in partic-
ular for small shops.  
 
Fourthly, the homogeneity or heterogeneity of supply and demand matters. With 
increasing homogeneity of demand, a single platform or retailer becomes more 
likely. However, for a product range as comprehensive as Amazon’s, demand is 
characterized by strong heterogeneity. Consequently, an inevitable (‘natural’) trend 
towards one platform for everything and everyone appears to be rather unlikely. 
Quite in contrast, in addition to present competitors like the (nowadays commer-
cialized) Ebay marketplace, financially strong companies like WalMart, Macy’s or 
John Lewis are currently investing billions of US$ to create and establish competing 
e-commerce platforms. Furthermore, recent news and rumors that platforms such 
as YouTube and GoogleShopping as well as Twitter are introducing or are consider-
ing introducing direct buy opportunities (“buy buttons”) in their services point to-
wards a dynamic differentiation of commercial online trading. 
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Fifth, a higher intensity of innovation (inter alia, creating and maintaining hetero-
geneity of supply) decreases the tendency towards monopoly. Since online markets 
are still rather young, the innovation dynamics are rather likely to remain very high. 
In summary, an inherent, ‘natural’ trend towards an Amazon retailing and market-
place monopoly cannot be derived from an economic perspective. While there are 
factors favoring a stronger market concentration online compared to offline, many 
countervailing factors exist, in particular, multi-homing and the heterogeneity of 
supply and demand. As it is now, Amazon is not in the position of being a domi-
nant gatekeeper to commercial online trading and producers or shops are not de-
pending on access to Amazon in order to be able to compete. Consequently, a 
public-utility-like regulation of Amazon cannot not be justified from an economic 
perspective.  
 
4.   Unfair Competition 
Another allegation brought forward in the press claims that Amazon deceives con-
sumers into shopping by misleading price information and biased or manipulated 
‘customer’ reviews. Indeed, there are documented cases where Amazon compared 
its price to a faked higher reference price or producer price recommendation that 
never existed as such. In doing so, Amazon made the price difference or the dis-
count look much larger than it actually was. Such misleading price information is 
clearly anticompetitive. It triggered action by the respective authorities. For in-
stance, Amazon was sentenced by a German court in such a case in 2014.12 Accord-
ing to the available evidence, these cases apparently are exceptions, though, and 
not the rule. 
 
The issue of biased ‘customer’ reviews relates to faked reviews or to biased rank-
ings of reviews in order to promote sales by giving the customer a better impres-
sion of the product in question. While this clearly would be anticompetitive, there 
is no empirical evidence that Amazon has or is engaging in such practices (to our 
12 Landgericht Köln (district court of Cologne), judgment from 2014-10-02, Az.: 81 O 74/14. 
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best knowledge). Some suppliers on Amazon’s marketplace13, however, have done 
so and were sued accordingly by Amazon as well as delisted from the marketplace. 
Altogether, there is not much empirical evidence to support this allegation, with 
the exception of single cases of marketplace suppliers followed by swift action from 
Amazon’s side against the perpetrators. 
 
According to Authors United (2015b: 17, ft. 30-31), Amazon deceives the consum-
er regarding its search service for finding goods (such as books) on its platform. 
While search rankings and related recommendations appear to be ‘neutral’ and 
‘objective’ to the customer, Authors United claims that they are up for sale and 
Amazon ‘encourages’ publishers and even authors to pay for higher ranking posi-
tions. If sponsored search results are pretending to follow purely relevance criteria, 
then the consumer may be misled in her buying decision, which would be anti-
competitive and reduce consumer welfare. Note that sponsored search results or 
rankings are not per se a problem, but Amazon needs to be transparent about it 
and must not pretend to rank according to conjectured consumer preferences on-
ly.14 To our best knowledge, independent empirical evidence on this allegation is 
not available at the time of writing. 
 
5.   Abuse of Dominance in the E-Book Market 
a.   A Long List of Allegations 
Among the most widespread complaints about anticompetitive behavior by Ama-
zon are allegations that Amazon is abusing its market power in book retailing by 
imposing anticompetitive (‘squeezing’) conditions on book publishers – with con-
sequent negative effects for authors and consumers. For instance, Authors United 
(2015b: 6) present the following list of how Amazon exploits its position: 
- blocking or curtailing the sale of certain authors’ books, causing damage to 
those authors’ careers, 
13 Sometimes, these suppliers commissioned specialized product rating promotion agencies who 
then engaged in rating biasing strategies. 
14 See Dewenter & Lüth (2015) on a consumer preference based approach to the concept of search 
neutrality (in the context of Google). 
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- imposing (under the threat of punishment) higher margins for itself on pub-
lishers, directly and indirectly through the imposition of creative fees15, 
- charging readers higher (compared to a more open and competitive market) 
prices for many scarce and obscure books, 
- generating fear in and stifling the free expression of authors, agents, editors, 
publishers, and others who do not cooperate with the company, and 
- steering readers toward buying books published by Amazon and away from 
books published by other companies. 
 
The allegations are detailed in the respective position paper (Authors United 2015b: 
7-18). These and further allegations can be categorized into four main groups of 
exploitative abuse: 
(i) Amazon allegedly abuses its buyer power to acquire anticompeti-
tive rents from publishers (vertical effect). 
(ii) Amazon allegedly uses anticompetitive means to abusively enforce 
its buyer power (vertical effect). 
(iii) Amazon allegedly abuses its buyer power to improve the market 
position of its own publishing subsidiaries at the expense of inde-
pendent publishers (vertical abuse with horizontal effects on the 
upstream market). 
(iv) Amazon allegedly abuses its dominant retailer position by charging 
supracompetitive prices and limiting output and diversity of books. 
 
Even though these allegations are interrelated, we will tackle them separately for 
analytical reasons. 
 
b.   Prices, Margins, and the Retailing Model of E-Books 
So, before we discuss whether the means that Amazon employs are anticompeti-
tive (section c), we analyze whether Amazon’s price and margin targets squeeze 
15 Similar allegations fuel a brand new case recently brought to the Federal Cartel Office of Germa-
ny and to the European Commission by the association of German booksellers in September 
2015 regarding the German audio books market (http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/21/ 
amazoncom- germany-antitrust-idUSL5N11R2DE20150921; retrieved 2015-09-24, 17:30). 
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publishers. Since the 2010s, Amazon simultaneously demands lower wholesale or 
purchase prices for and a higher share of the revenue from e-books. In countries 
like Germany where the law mandates resale price maintenance for books16, Ama-
zon demands lower consumer prices instead of lower wholesale prices (and also a 
higher share of the revenues).  
 
At the heart of this discussion lies the price relation between print books and e-
books. While the (major) publishers seek to keep e-book prices on a level similar or 
close to the print book prices, Amazon targets e-book prices significantly below this 
level. 
 
From an economic perspective, two aspects support Amazon’s position in this con-
troversy. First, the cost structure of e-books significantly differs from that of print 
books. Several cost elements like printing costs and related costs, stocking costs, 
and delivery costs do not exist for e-books. From an allocative efficiency point of 
view, it therefore appears to be justified that e-books prices should be considerably 
lower than printed book prices. Second, lower e-book prices promote and acceler-
ate the diffusion of the new technologies surrounding ‘digital books and electronic 
reading’, thus, giving rise to dynamic efficiency gains (innovation). Actually, there 
may be indication that major publishers seek to decelerate the change towards e-
books in order to preserve rents and/or acquire additional rents by keeping prices 
up despite decreasing costs. Such a scenario would imply a collusive equilibrium on 
the oligopolistic (major) publishers market with Amazon being a procompetitive 
force employing its countervailing power to break up this collusive equilibrium. U.S. 
competition authorities did find evidence that major publishers colluded (among 
each other and with Apple) in order to preserve higher prices.17 On the other hand, 
one must consider that the book industry is characterized by considerable fixed 
16 The German Buchpreisbindungsgesetz (law on book pricing maintenance) mandates that pub-
lishers must set final consumer prices for all new titles (not older than 18 months, counting sepa-
rately for every edition) in German Language or dedicated to the German market (with few ex-
ceptions). Following a recent court judgment from Landgericht Wiesbaden (2015-01-14), this in-
cludes e-books and print-books according to dominant legal thought. Notwithstanding, an 
amendment to the Buchpreisbindungsgesetz to explicitly include e-books is currently under con-
sideration. 
17 US vs. Apple, Inc. et al., Case No. 1:12-cv-02826-DLC. 
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costs (in particular the creative act of writing the book) that need to be recovered 
even if marginal costs of additional copies are very low. Otherwise, the incentive to 
produce new content may be harmed at the expense of consumers and society. 
With the help of publicly available information, we cannot estimate whether Ama-
zon’s price targets merely reflect decreasing costs of e-books (compared to print 
books) or squeeze into the recoupment of fixed costs. However, from an economic 
perspective, it is reasonable that e-book prices should be lower than print book 
prices ceteris paribus. 
 
The e-book pricing controversy relates to the choice of the retail model because the 
latter reflects the different positions. Amazon favors the classic retailing model, the 
wholesale model, because it offers the retailer more freedom to negotiate buying 
conditions and to set consumer prices. In contrast, the (major) publishers advocate 
the so-called agency model, where all prices are set by the publisher, much like in 
the mandatory resale price maintenance model of Germany. This was also at the 
heart of the Apple-publishers collusion case:18 Apple and a group of major publish-
ers agreed to sell e-books in the U.S. via Apple’s iTunes platform via the agency 
model with resale price maintenance and best-price clauses (see for the latter sec-
tion III.2.b). In doing so, they attempted to force Amazon to accept this model as 
well.19 In 2015, the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a lower court judg-
ment that sentenced the collusion with fines of US$ 20-25 millions for the partici-
pating publishers, US$ 450 million for Apple and, inter alia, a prohibition of resale 
price maintenance and best-price clauses for a five year period.20 This case trig-
gered a number of economic papers analyzing the welfare effects of the two dif-
ferent models in e-book markets. While some studies find positive short-term ef-
fects of the agency model (de los Santos & Wildenbeest 2014), other models reveal 
positive midterm effects of the wholesale model (Gaudin & White 2014, Johnson 
18 US vs. Apple, Inc. et al., Case No. 1:12-cv-02826-DLC. 
19 See for more comprehensive discussions of this case Kirkwood (2014), Köhler (2015) and Vezzo-
so (2015) as well as the case decision US vs. Apple, Inc. et al., Case No. 1:12-cv-02826-DLC. 
20 See http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/30/us-apple-ebooks-decision-
idUSKCN0PA1RS20150630. As of writing, Apple is considering an appeal to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, asking it to overturn the affirmative decision of the Federal Court (http://appleinsider.com/ 
articles/15/09/17/apple-appeals-to-supreme-court-in-e-books-price-fixing-antitrust-case; 2015-09-
24, 17:35). 
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2014). Looking at this literature as a whole (adding Jullien & Rey 2007, Foros et al. 
2014) shows that the crucial factor for the derived effects is the intensity of compe-
tition on the two vertical levels, the upstream publisher level and the downstream 
retailing level. If competition is less intense on the publisher level than on the re-
tailer level – be it through collusion or because of concentration – then the whole-
sale model is advantageous in terms of welfare since, in tendency, it weakens the 
power of the publishers. Vice versa, if competition is less intense on the retailing 
level than on the publisher level – be it through dominance or through collusion – 
then the agency model is advantageous from a welfare perspective. 
 
Transferring the insight from economic theory literature to market reality conse-
quently requires an assessment of the relative competition intensities. In the tradi-
tional offline world, the competition intensity on the publisher level was certainly 
lower than on the retailing level, which was in most countries characterized by a 
rather dispersed structure of bookshops and chains. This picture, however, has 
clearly changed and it can hardly be denied that Amazon is much more powerful 
than any bookstore chain has ever been. This may indicate a reversal of the situa-
tion, namely that now and/or in the near future, the competition intensity on the 
retailing level could become less intense than on the publisher level, favoring agen-
cy models for the sale of e-books. However, this would require an in-depth analysis 
including not only Amazon’s actual market position (indeed characterized by high 
market shares, although not universally so, see section II) but also the contestability 
of the market as well as the threat of potential entrants. Recent entry activities – 
Apple’s iBook Store, Microsoft in cooperation with Barnes & Noble, several cooper-
ative projects of bookseller associations in different countries, Google Play, etc. – 
support the existence of considerable contestability. 
 
Notwithstanding, follow-up effects of mutual attempts to create countervailing 
power on both stages of the vertical relation do present a concern: “Amazon’s 
power over book sales also has been a major factor in causing publishers to com-
bine to increase their ability to resist Amazon’s demands. The most extreme such 
merger took place in 2013, with the combination of the biggest two of the ‘Big Six’ 
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publishers, Random House and Penguin. Given that sales of Random House and 
Penguin equal those of the next four trade publishers together, many expect the 
remaining trade publishers will follow suit, until we see the ranks of top tier pub-
lishers trimmed to three or even two giant corporations. Such mergers further 
harm the interests of readers, authors, and the citizenry at large” (Authors United 
2015b: 7). Thus, concentration problems may arise on both the upstream and the 
downstream market and certainly warrant attention of competition agencies re-
garding further mergers and acquisitions activities. 
 
c.   The Means Employed By Amazon 
While economic analysis finds (limited and conditional) support of Amazon’s e-
book pricing policy, some of the means with which Amazon tries to enforce its 
stance are difficult to justify as procompetitive, except if one reverts to a radical 
effects-based approach, advocating a ‘the-end-justifies-all-means’ position. Then, if 
the outcome is efficient, it does not matter how it is reached. However, the eco-
nomic concepts of distinguishing between competition on the merits (performance 
competition) and handicap competition (impediment competition, related also to 
raising rivals costs) imply that even if the target is justified in terms of efficiency, 
the means to achieve it still should not include strategies that handicap and (in ab-
solute terms) deteriorate the performance of the competitors (Eucken 1952, 2006; 
Budzinski 2008). 
 
If Amazon and a publisher cannot agree on terms of wholesale delivery, then of 
course it is Amazon’s entrepreneurial freedom to delist those titles from its plat-
form or shop. This may differ if Amazon was actually an incontestable monopolist, 
which however can hardly be substantiated for the national general book markets 
in most countries as it is now. However, in several cases where publishers did not 
agree to changes of contractual conditions by Amazon (for example Melville House 
2005, Hachette 2014 and Bonnier 201421), Amazon employed means seeking to 
penalize the ‘non-compliant’ publisher and hurt its business and that of its authors 
21 See Köhler (2015, ch. 5.3.5) for more information on these cases. 
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beyond a simple delisting. These rather obviously handicapping means included, 
inter alia,  
- an artificial increase of delivery times (from the usual few days to many 
weeks or even several months),  
- deactivating buy-buttons,  
- biasing search results,  
- placing pop-up advertisement for titles of ‘compliant’ publishers or from Am-
azon’s own publishing services over selected titles,  
- as well as other means along these lines. 
 
These means are dishonest towards the consumer (and as such harming consumer 
welfare), discriminatory and inappropriate. Also, the artificial creation of intrans-
parency over sales numbers, turnovers and invoices towards publishers does not 
serve any efficiency effect and plainly and simply harms the business of the affected 
publishers. Amazon introduced this type of supplier treatment in the context of the 
so-called ‘gazelle project’ seeking to discipline smaller publishers such as, for in-
stance, Melville House (Foer 2014). 
 
It represents an interesting question, however, whether the mere fact that Amazon 
thinks it can afford to employ such means is already an indication that it indeed 
enjoys considerable market power vis-à-vis the publishers. 
 
d.   Horizontal Effects from Vertical Conduct 
Amazon is not only active on the retailing level but also has own business interests 
on the publisher level (Amazon’s publishing services). This further complicates the 
case. In theory, a dominant position on the retailer level may enable Amazon to 
leverage market power upstream to the publisher level. In other words, Amazon 
may favor its own publishing services at the expense of competing publishers (for 
instance, through demanding different conditions of supply, but also through more 
indirect means like biasing its search service) and, thus, anticompetitively increase 
its market share in the publishers market (Authors United 2015b: 14-15).  
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Irrespective of the problem, whether Amazon actually has sufficient market power 
to successfully enforce such an anticompetitive leveraging, it appears to be ques-
tionable whether it actually experiences sufficient incentives to do so. Amazon’s 
publishing activities focus on so-called self-publishing services, which are consider-
ably different to the services offered by major ‘traditional’ publishers as the self-
publishing services do not include “virtually no (.) editing, designing, or vetting the 
books for accuracy and quality” (Authors United 2015b: 15). This can be viewed as 
indication that Amazon’s publishing services address different authors – and per-
haps even different readers – than the traditional publishing houses. The market for 
books generally represents a strongly heterogeneous and segmented market. Un-
less empirical evidence displays a strong substitution elasticity between either au-
thors or readers of both types of publishers – to our best knowledge there is no 
such study so far – an anticompetitive leveraging effect does not appear to be 
plausible. 
 
e.   Diversity, Quality, and Consumer Harm 
According to some critics, Amazon’s practices lead to a decrease in published titles 
and, thus, less diversity. “In a well-documented trend, publishers have responded 
not just by cutting advances, but by publishing fewer titles and by focusing more 
on books by established bestselling authors and celebrities. Some authors who 
would otherwise be published can no longer attract the financial support they need 
to write their books. Readers are presented with fewer books that espouse unusual, 
quirky, offbeat, or politically risky ideas, as well as books from new and unproven 
authors” (Authors United 2015b: 16). Thus, the diversity of book publications may 
be endangered and the reduction of book titles may be biased against particularly 
innovative contents. This touches upon an issue that reaches beyond purely eco-
nomic considerations of consumers’ preference satisfaction and involves funda-
mental aspects of society. If the claim of Authors United is empirically true, then 
this represents an area of concern. 
 
However, at the same time, the combination of digital content, broadband inter-
net, and increasing self-publishing options as well as easier access to a wider range 
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of books due to decreasing transaction and stocking costs may counterbalance this 
effect: there may actually be more possibilities to publish and access book-like con-
tents now than ever before. Note that to some extent, this interacts with the hori-
zontal effects discussed in the preceding section: Amazon’s self-publishing services 
have certainly broadened the diversity of available books, in particular with regard 
to non-mainstream ideas and content. Especially, authors that could not find a tra-
ditional publisher for their ideas now contribute to and enrich the diversity of titles 
whereas their works remained unpublished and unavailable in former times. The 
changes in publishing and reading opportunities and behavior may well imply that 
traditional business models need to adapt and come under pressure if they fail to 
do so. However, this is neither anticompetitive nor a priori anti-diversity. 
 
A different but related complaint criticizes exactly the increasing diversity through 
self-publishing by pointing to a lack of quality control. While traditional publishing 
houses carefully assess the quality of book offers before deciding what to publish, 
self-publishing houses (as well as alternative online publishing options) often mere-
ly exclude law-violating contents. Quality of contents is notoriously difficult to 
evaluate. While the authors published by traditional publishing houses (like Authors 
United) represent the insider view of the ‘traditional’ system, outsider authors may 
have very different views on this type of quality control. From an economic per-
spective, it requires empirical evidence that is not restricted to major publishers 
and/or transparent and independent quality definitions and standards to support 
claims of a problematic loss of diversity. 
 
In line with the modern economic theory of media bias and diversity (inter alia, 
Dewenter 2007; Gentzkow & Shapiro 2010; Anderson & McLaren 2012), a threat to 
pluralism may surface if a monopolistic retailer does not exclusively pursue profit 
(maximization) goals but also a political or cultural agenda for which she is willing 
to sacrifice some profits. For instance, a monopolistic retailer may navigate cus-
tomers around certain books by means of its recommendation and searching ser-
vice so that they never see or find them (Authors United 2015b: 18). This may also 
happen in competition, and it can happen with (human merchandisers of) offline 
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retailers as well. However, competition among retailers just like competition among 
publishers significantly reduces the biasing effects of such strategies. Thus, there 
may be an increasing justification for regulation with increasing market power of a 
dominant retailer if this retailer also pursues other than purely economic interests. 
 
IV.   Potential Remedies: What Should Be Done – and What Not! 
The preceding analysis of the manifold allegations against Amazon regarding anti-
competitive strategies yields limited areas of conduct where presently concerns are 
justified from an economic perspective. Some widespread allegations cannot be 
supported. Market failure due to negative externalities appears to be very unlikely 
in any scenario (section III.1) and also an inherent and inevitable trend towards an 
Amazon retailing monopoly – like a natural monopoly, monopolistic gatekeeper or 
an essential facility – requires very strong and rather unrealistic assumptions (sec-
tion III.3). Allegations of anticompetitive pricing strategies (section III.2), unfair 
business practices (III.4) and vertical abuse of market power in the e-book market 
(section III.5) cannot be dismissed in total and their analysis leads to a differentiat-
ed picture. While there is little evidence and indication for traditional predatory 
pricing, some best-price-clause practices are likely to harm competition and create 
entry barriers, in particular if Amazon enjoys market power. Moreover, Amazon did 
engage in cases of misleading price information, whereas there is no evidence or 
indication that biasing customer reviews has been relevant. Eventually, vertical rela-
tions in the fast growing e-book market warrant concerns about competition. The 
power gamble between major publishers and Amazon’s power as a retailer is ongo-
ing and requires careful theoretical and empirical analysis to identify and isolate 
anticompetitive behavior and arrangements on both the upstream and the down-
stream market. Here, Amazon appears to be both conducting and facing anticom-
petitive action. Preserving competition on both market stages will be a challenging 
task for the competition authorities. 
 
In terms of remedies, our analysis clearly shows that the calls for strong regulatory 
interventions are not appropriate and may, in contrast, risk destroying positive wel-
fare and efficiency effects from Amazon’s business. Putting Amazon – together 
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with other internet platforms with high market shares like Google, Facebook, etc. – 
under the reigns of a special sectoral regulatory agency treating it like a public utili-
ty would be wide off the mark. Such a regulatory agency’s task of providing (de-
tailed) access regulation is unnecessary because the monopolistic gatekeeper claims 
and doomsday scenarios of all-conquering negative externalities (sections III.3 and 
III.1) have to be rejected from an economic perspective. Furthermore, negative ef-
fects on allocative and dynamic efficiency would be difficult to avoid given the limi-
tations and inherent bureaucracy mechanisms of powerful regulatory agencies. 
Such agencies typically do not possess the necessary knowledge to provide efficient 
market or (access) price structures. Moreover, they experience incentives to extend 
and detail their regulatory tasks in order to maximize budget and power (econom-
ics of bureaucracy; Niskanen 1968). This would severely harm Amazon’s abilities to 
provide efficient and innovative online commercial services. Therefore, such a regu-
lation would be against and at the expense of the welfare of the consumers. 
 
Similarly, the European Parliament’s initiative to break up or unbundle powerful 
internet platforms (admittedly targeting Google and not so much Amazon) should 
not be extended to commercial trading platforms.22 For most of Amazon’s busi-
ness, this would either make no sense or would not heal the (remaining) problems. 
Unbundling Amazon as a retailer from Amazon as a marketplace would indeed re-
duce some negative horizontal effects from best-price clauses, however, not all – 
and, thus, would be considerably less effective than the much milder competition 
policy intervention prohibiting these clauses. Furthermore, an unbundling of Ama-
zon’s marketplace and retailing business might lead to efficiency losses due to a 
lower degree of indirect network effects on the platform side of the business. Sepa-
rating Amazon’s retailing activities in the book market from its publishing services 
would indeed erase any scope for vertical leveraging effects. However, they merely 
become possible in very specific and not very likely scenarios (see section III.5), 
therefore, forced unbundling with all its legal (violation of property rights, etc.) and 
economic problems (governmental or administrative design of market structures; 
22 And it is also highly doubtful whether unbundling Google’s search services from its other com-
mercial activities would be procompetitive and welfare increasing. 
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pretence of knowledge23, frustration of innovation, etc.) represents an inadequate 
and inappropriate intervention. 
 
Instead applying the existing competition rules represents a much more effective 
and appropriate tool for addressing the competition concerns regarding Amazon 
that survive a sound economic analysis. With respect to consumer protection relat-
ed infringements like misleading price information (see section III.4), this has al-
ready worked well. Regarding the more complex concerns like best-price clauses, 
vertical abuse of dominance, etc., competition authorities are well equipped to in-
vestigate and handle these issues. They first require sound in-depth analysis of data 
(which is publicly not available but which competition authorities can access in the 
course of investigations) in order to identify the right scenario – existence and ex-
tend of market power of Amazon, possible countervailing power, etc. – and conse-
quently apply the appropriate economic conclusions. Applying the competition pol-
icy framework, moreover, offers scope for tailor-made remedies addressing precise-
ly the issues causing anticompetitive effects and minimizing collateral damages – in 
stark contrast to more ambitious regulatory interventions. 
 
Of course, competition policy does not get every case right and this is particularly 
true for comparatively new, innovative and quickly changing markets in the context 
of the digital economy. However, this further corroborates the advantages of com-
petition policy over alternative regulations: by focusing on preventing evidently an-
ticompetitive strategies and arrangements, it does not overly restrict the dynamics 
of the markets. In the case of Amazon, competition policy investigations – and (if 
found necessary) subsequent interventions – presently appear to be justified re-
garding best-price clauses and generally into the book market, in particular e-books 
and audio books. Insofar, Krugman’s call for antitrust action is justified to some 
extent. However, the scope for necessary investigations is rather limited compared 
to Amazon’s diverse business activities. In the e-book market, for instance, it is not 
completely clear that Amazon is the only offender from a competition economics 
23 See Hayek (1975). 
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perspective. Therefore, we do not agree with Krugman about the extent and de-
gree of violations of competition by Amazon.  
 
V.   Conclusion 
Amazon has been impressively successful in establishing an online commercial trad-
ing platform across most of consumer goods categories. Without doubt, this suc-
cess is due to innovation and efficiency, i.e. due to performance competition, and 
nets considerable welfare advantages for consumers. Along with the success, Ama-
zon had achieved an impressive size, impressive market shares and in some markets 
positions of dominance (or at least not far away from dominance). Success in busi-
ness competition is typically accompanied by obtaining market power – and once 
power is there, incentives to abuse this power for future success kick in, irrespective 
of hitherto merits of the powerful company. As a consequence, strategies of com-
peting on the merits may get mixed with or even replaced by strategies of handicap 
competition. Therefore, it is natural that leading market positions come along with 
critical attention of competitors, suppliers, customers, experts, and antitrust au-
thorities. Not surprisingly, complaints about the competitive behavior of Amazon 
are becoming more frequent, be it from publishers, authors, or from famous econ-
omists. And also competition authorities are starting to monitor and investigate 
Amazon. 
 
Against this background, we collect allegations of anticompetitive behavior by Am-
azon as well as anticompetitive effects from Amazon’s success story in this paper. 
For the purpose of providing an economics-based cross-check on the plausibility 
and vindication, we categorize these public allegations in five categories: negative 
externalities (III.1), predatory pricing and monopolization (III.2), natural monopoly 
(III.3), unfair competition (III.4), and vertical abuse of dominance (III.5). Our discus-
sion identifies several areas of anticompetitive concern, namely the (price-) compe-
tition-lessening effects of best-price clauses, consumer-misleading price and search 
information, and the competitive relations in the book market, in particular, in the 
e-book submarket. These aspects warrant competition policy investigation and may 
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warrant (depending on the results24) subsequent antitrust action. However, even if 
Amazon was offending competition rules in all these cases (which is far from cer-
tain), it would hardly justify the doomsday scenarios put out by some of its critics. 
Even Krugman’s (2014) assessment that Amazon is the worst threat to competition 
since Standard Oil appears to be over-exaggerating.  
 
The rather modest findings of anticompetitive concerns (compared to the allega-
tions in the public and the media) correspond to calling for caution when it comes 
to remedies and interventions. Calls for breaking-up successful and powerful inter-
net platforms like Amazon as well as concepts of implementing special regulatory 
authorities significantly restricting Amazon’s entrepreneurial freedom are both in-
appropriate and pose considerable danger to consumer welfare. Limiting Amazon’s 
creative potential regarding innovation and efficiency goes along with significant 
and severe harm to dynamic welfare and would require an essential-facility-type of 
quasi-monopolistic gatekeeper position of Amazon for online commercial trade to 
be seriously considered (and even then many pitfalls remain). Today, Amazon clear-
ly is not in such a position and it appears to be implausible that this should change 
in the near future (see sections III.3 and IV). There are relevant alternative ways for 
producers and shops to access consumers and the number of online competitors 
appears to be growing rather than shrinking. Thus, it is important not to revert to 
‘global’ regulatory instruments but instead to identify concrete markets, arrange-
ments and modes of behavior that display anticompetitive effects and remedy ac-
cordingly. Competition policy is definitely better up to this task than regulatory al-
ternatives. 
 
Of course, the future may bring new challenges and considerably change today’s 
assessment. The role of data is likely to increase also in terms of competition effects 
(next to more fundamental privacy issues that are not addressed in this paper). The 
availability of individualized consumption patterns from its data base may allow 
24 Since we can only work with publicly available information and data, we cannot draw definite 
conclusions here. 
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Amazon to successfully establish individualized or personalized pricing strategies.25 
Then, every consumer would face a different price of a given product on her con-
sumer screen depending on her individual past consumption pattern combined 
with demographic, geographic and other personal data. Perhaps, this could allow 
Amazon to implement (close-to) perfect first degree price discrimination, i.e. pric-
ing each consumer according to her individual willingness-to-pay. While this would 
increase producers’ rents, it would reduce consumers’ rents – and also the total 
economic effect may be negative because the perfectly skimmed consumers’ rent 
cannot be used for additional consumption activities anymore. However, individual-
ized pricing in online commerce requires economic research. Welfare as well as 
competition effects – positive and negative ones – need to be carefully analyzed 
and assessed. 
 
So, is Amazon the next Google? The answer is ‘yes’ because competition policy will 
focus intensively on it in the upcoming years. The answer is also ‘yes’ because pub-
lic fears and (sometimes) hysteria go well beyond actual threats to competition. 
And, eventually, another ‘yes’ relates to the necessity of frustrating abuses of mar-
ket power in order to induce these internet ‘giants’ to keep focusing on innovative 
and efficient strategies. In terms of detailed competition analysis, the answer is 
‘no’, however, because the markets and the characteristics of Amazon’s business 
differ significantly from Google’s business – at least for now. 
  
25 First attempts have already been ongoing. 
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